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| Allanea |
Posted: Jun 13 2012, 03:29 AM
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You have way too much time on your hands ... Group: Moderators Posts: 3,729 Member No.: 88 Joined: 27-May 07 |
Translated from Ryadovoy-K
E.K.Kolesnikov, Mil. Sc. D. Yu. V. Kalinin, Col. THE MANEUVER IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS Combat operations in local wars and armed conflicts of the past decade show that the decisive role in combat operations will still be determined by maneuvers, both by force and fire, with the role of remote fire engagement of opponents growing immesurably as compared to the direct engagement of ground forces. This trend continues. As shown by the experience of combat operations in the Persian Gulf region, as well as NATO agression in Yugoslavia, developed countries combating opponents well-known to be at a disadvantage to them, seek to achieve operational, and even strategic war goals through the use of fire. The role of air forces in accomplishing fire objectives reaches 80%. The first task of strike aviation becomes disabling elements of the opponents AA and anti-missile deefense (AMD) and achieving air superiority. In such conditions, the defender is faced with a double task. First of all, he must engage as many of the opponents air strike tools, and second – preserve the capability and effectiveness of his air defense system. In resolving this task a major role belongs to the maneuver. One has to expect that the aggressor's first blow will be delivered using air-, ground-, and sea-based missiles, against AA and AMD radar stations, as well as stationary communications nodes, airfields and energy industry plants. His main goal will be to “blind” the opponent's air defense system, disrupting control at the state, strategic, and operational-strategic levels. In a sudden attack this goal is quite achievable, should defenders fail to utilize the full scope of operational camouflage, including maneuvers by signals forces, AA missile launchers and other mobile weapons – those that would be likeliest targets for the first strike. Attempts by defender forces to create a full radar field to prevent a first strike (and therefore keeping most of their radar stations operating) might become fatal, as the opponent will be able to easily spy out their location and disable them with self-guiding munitions. Therefore, the most effective means of aerial reconnaissance on the eve of warfare can be an aviation system of remote radar observation. Its use, coupled with space-based and ground-based radar reconnaissance, performed by individual radar stations on threatened (or not otherwise monitored) directions, will allow the defender to preserve the durability of the entire AA system. All other mobile elements of the AA and AMD systems must be kept constantly maneuvering. We believe it would be useful to develop a special maneuver plan for these forces, so as to avoid a contingency where all, or most, of these weapons are simultaneously on the move, and incapable of participating in deflecting an opponent's aerial attack. The same principle applies to mobile radio-transmitting elements of the control systems, whose movement can be easily detected by the opponent's reconnaissance, and which can be struck with guided munitions. Their timely maneuvering, combined with periods of complete radio silence and the use of operational camouflage activities, can preserve the survivability of the C&C system even in the event of sudden aggression by the opponent. In a sudden attack is is far harder to preserve the survivability of aviation based on stationary airfields, as their location is easy to determine. Here, too, the most effective method is maneuver, which in this case consists of dispersing the aviation, moving the planes between airfields, using spare (auxiliary) airfields etc. However, preserving the survivability of aviation, AA/ABM systems and C3 – only one side of a united task. The other side consists of engaging the opponent, especially his means of air attack. For this purpose, maneuver by forces and fire is once more required. Experience shows that the first to engage the opponent's air attack weapons are the systems of organic AMD (to engage operational-tactical rockets and cruise missiles) and AA. The force of AA missile systems available to Russia can be utilized effectively only if they are united into a single system using computer technology, and can maneuver at the proper time. AA and AMD systems must engage OPFOR airplanes and missiles not only on their approaches and at the depth of the defense (i.e. to be deployed in-depth), but to also be able to concentrate the fire of AA rocket complexes dispersed along a front line on a single threatened direction (that is, to maneuver along the front with their rocket trajectory). Because developed states' aviation desires to strike ground objects without being threatened by AA weaponry, one can predict with a great degree of likelihood that, before attempting to engage defending forces, the opponent will first attempt to break through the AA and AMD systems. In this context, it is important to restore these systems in those areas where a breakthrough has already occurred, and to accomplish this either by maneuvering AA means from the depth of the defenses or along the front, as well as through shifting (maneuvering by) fire. As it is well known, a maneuver by AA forces and units to restore a disrupted system requires quite a lot of time. Time is needed for commanders to take decisions and pose goals, as well as to move units and deploy them in new areas. This period can take several hours, while the restoration of the AA system must be completed before the new OPFOR air strike arrives It has to be taken into account that with every new air strikes the possibilities in terms of AA system restoration diminish, i.e. within a few consecutive massed air strikes the opponent may reach his goal – air superiority. Therefore, it would seem to be more effective to restore AA systems on the breakthrough area in the time that OPFOR aviation requires to deliver their blow deep in our defense systems and return home. It is at the moment where the opponent's strike aircraft will be returning through the breach in our AA systems that they will become targets. Of course it is unlikely that it would be possible to move AA means within several dozen minutes, for example, to a distance of several dozen kilometers. Therefore, maneuver by fire from the flanks, coordinated with the fire of surviving or ambushing AA weapons can assist in inflicting unacceptable casualties to OPFOR aviation and disrupting its next massed operations. Doubtlessly, maneuver alone cannot resolve the task of fending off OPFOR air attacks. A complex of measures is needed, defined in guiding documents and dictated by the theory and practice of the operational art. Nevertheless, there are all the reasons to state that maneuver by AA forces, means and units has a decisive role in preserving the survivability of the entire system and destroying the opponent's main means of aerial attack. Maneuver is at least as important while deflecting a ground-forces offensive. When performed by ground fores, aviation, rocket forces' strikes and artillery fire, it assists in creatign a stable, active defense. Maneuver by fire and blows can be utilized to strike the most important targets and OPFOR force groups, as well as covering breaches and gaps in defensive lines. Obviously it is impossible to be equally strong in all directions. Concentrating all or most of one's weapons on a limited area, even if it is the most threatened area, is not desirable due to the danger of them being destroyed by the opponent's fire. Dispersion, on the other hand, increases survivability but reduces the possibilities for massing forces and means. Maneuvering by blows and fire allows solving the problem of effort concentration without moving forces, units, and weapons. However, it is not sufficient to shift one's fire to an endangered area to stop an opponent's offensive. As we know, for that we must firmly hold the defensive lines already held, as well as deliver counterblows and counterattacks. The stability of the defensive on the directions of the opponent's main blow depends on reinforcing units holding certain defensive lines of positions, including at the expense of maneuvering with units and unit groups (sometimes even strategic groups). In this case the maneuver must be carried out timely, and utilize all forms of force movement, both simultaneous and in turn, utilizing all forms of ground and air transport. The success of a force maneuver is made more likely by the deployment of the forces in echelon. Given that the opponent, most likely, will advance in the directions with the best-developed road networks, it is possible to predict the direction his main blow with a good degree of probability, and concentrate forces there ahead of time. In circumstances in which the opponent will attempt to breach or bypass the main defensive line rapidly, reaching a wide-open operational space, the defenders' maneuver must be carried out at a tempo greater than the opponent's offensive tempo. In all cases, during a maneuver the forces must be reliably protected from the opponent's air strikes, the roads and routes of the movement prepared ahead of time. Counterattacks and counterblows are the most active form of defensive activities, consisting of moving reserves and second echelons on the threatened directions, and routing a breaching or wedging-in OPFOR group. In short, counter-blow forces carry out their tasks by maneuvering with units, unit-groups, and fire to create a decisive forces and means superiority over the opponent. Finally we must note that the maneuver is not a goal in and of itself. It must be carried out to resolve carefully defined tasks, among others, pre-empting the opponent in arriving onto important lines or areas, achieving surprise and suddenness of action, as well as moving forces, units and weapons away from a blow. -------------------- ![]() ![]() "That's fucking epic!" ~~ Scandavian States, on my translations " Fucking awesome. Do more." ~~Questers, on my translations |
| Kyiv |
Posted: Jun 13 2012, 06:40 AM
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![]() My tank is umbrella! Group: Members Posts: 2,903 Member No.: 401 Joined: 3-June 08 |
I can't think of anything insightful to say right now. Except that this is cool as usual.
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| Ekraysia |
Posted: Jun 13 2012, 03:32 PM
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68% Armaments Designer Group: Members Posts: 1,360 Member No.: 710 Joined: 9-May 09 |
Thanks as always!
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| Rich and Corporations |
Posted: Jun 14 2012, 10:41 AM
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![]() 84% Armaments Designer Group: Members Posts: 1,698 Member No.: 938 Joined: 19-July 10 |
To be clear, you mean the flanks provide covering fire?
Excellent information however. -------------------- <@Number_Muncher>it can only be sigged if it's a lie. No true statement has ever been sigged[/QUOTE] Praise for RnC
Now 100% efficient at fighting mod tyranny. |
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| Allanea |
Posted: Jun 14 2012, 12:01 PM
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You have way too much time on your hands ... Group: Moderators Posts: 3,729 Member No.: 88 Joined: 27-May 07 |
It means that rather than shifting the vehicles themselves from the flanks to seal the breach you will just shift the fire of these vehicles to do that.
-------------------- ![]() ![]() "That's fucking epic!" ~~ Scandavian States, on my translations " Fucking awesome. Do more." ~~Questers, on my translations |
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